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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Derrick Lawrence Hughes appeals from the summary dismissal of his Petition for Post
Conviction Relief, contending that the district court erred in dismissing the following claims that
Mr. Hughes' attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by:
1.

not being present during a psychosexual evaluation, including a polygraph, which
was used to predict future dangerousness, and, therefore, violated his Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment Rights;

2.

not being present during psychosexual evaluation, including a polygraph, which
was used to predict future dangerousness, and, therefore, violated his Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment Rights;

3.

failing to insure that the defendant had his Miranda 1 rights read to him prior to his
"PSI investigation;"

4.

failed to file a motion to suppress the polygraph; and

5.

did not insure that defendant had an independent psychiatrist as part of the
psychosexual evaluation, when the defendant had a right to the assistance of an
independent psychiatrist and thus, did not determine, prior to sentencing, what
"claims should be presented to the fact-finder or in interpreting the reports [sic]
findings or rebutting the states [sic] evidence."

He also contends the district court erred in finding that no prejudice inured to Mr. Hughes
despite a finding that his attorney rendered deficient performance vis a vis the psychosexual
evaluation for failing to provide Estrade( warnings.
Mr. Hughes requests that this court provide the correct legal analysis of the above issues,

and, where necessary, remand this case for appropriate factual findings.

1
2

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2007).

Appeals affirmed Mr. Hughes' judgment and sentences. See State v. Hughes, 2005 Unpublished
Opinion No. 633 (Ct. App., Oct. 26, 2005).
On November 14, 2006, Mr. Hughes timely filed his Petition for Post Conviction Relief
(hereinafter, Petition), and affidavit in support of his Petition. (R., pp.7-31.) In his Petition,

Mr. Hughes alleged, among other claims, that his attorney was ineffective for:
1.

not being present during a psychosexual evaluation, including a polygraph,
which was a critical stage and was used to predict future dangerousness, and,
therefore, violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights (R., pp.8, 15,
18-19);

2.

not being present during psychosexual evaluation, including a polygraph, with
which violated his right against self-incrimination and was used to predict
future dangerousness, and, therefore, violated his Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment Rights (R., pp.8-9, 18-20);

3.

failing to insure that the defendant had his Miranda3 rights read to him prior to
his "PSI investigation" (R., pp.9, 27-28);

4.

failed to file a motion to suppress the polygraph (R., p.15); and

5.

did not insure that defendant had an independent psychiatrist as part of the
psychosexual evaluation, when the defendant had a right to the assistance of
an independent psychiatrist and thus, did not determine, prior to sentencing,
what "claims should be presented to the fact-finder or in interpreting the
reports [sic] findings or rebutting the states [sic] evidence." (R., pp.8;21.)

Along with his Petition, Mr. Hughes filed a motion for appointment of counsel, which
was granted by the district court. (R., pp.38-42.) The State filed a Brief in Support of Motion to
Dismiss. (R., pp.55-80.) Appointed counsel then filed an Amended Petition for Post Conviction
Relief(hereina.fter, Amended Petition) and an additional affidavit. (R., pp.49-51, 115-118.) In

the Amended Petition, counsel realleged, and incorporated by reference, the claims made in
Mr. Hughes' Petition, and raised several additional issues. Post conviction counsel also filed a

privilege against self-incrimination rather than the specific Miranda warnings.

(R., p.143.)

Without deciding whether this was true, the court held that even if it was true and no warnings
were given, there could be no finding of deficient performance because, relying on Stuart v.
State, 145 Idaho 467, 180 P .2d 506 (Ct. App. 2008), the presentence investigation is not a critical

stage, and therefore, he had no right to the advice of counsel during the pre-sentence
investigation report.

(R., p.144.) The court also found that Mr. Hughes had waived any Fifth

Amendment claim in the pre-sentence report because he made no "showing that he protested to
participating in the PSI." (R., p.142.)
3.

Regarding the motion to suppress issue, while the district court did not

specifically address this issue, it granted the State's Motion to Dismiss in its entirety (R., p.133),
thus adopting the State's reasoning on this issue. The State argued that, "Petitioner fails to
present why the 'polygraph should have been suppressed at court,' so it is not possible to
evaluate whether the lack of suppression was ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner's
allegations fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding deficient performance, let alone
resulting prejudice, and therefore none are sufficient to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing."
(R., pp. 72-73.)

4.

As it related to Mr. Hughes claim that he should have been granted an

independent psychiatrist, that in fact, counsel had objected to the evaluation and asked for a new
one to be prepared (R., p.142), the court held that if the denial of a new evaluation was
erroneous, it was the doing of the district court and, therefore, should have been raised in direct
appeal. (R., p.142.) The court did not address the second part of the claim wherein Mr. Hughes
alleged his attorney should have obtained a confidential evaluation and reviewed it with
Mr. Hughes prior to its release to the court and the State. (R., p.143.)

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court erroneously analyze Mr. Hughes' claim that his attorney rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to the Sixth Amendment right to the effective
assistance of counsel for failing to be present of counsel during any or all phases of a
psychosexual evaluation?

2.

Did the district court incorrectly analyze Mr. Hughes' claim that his attorney rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to move to suppress the
psychosexual evaluation because the polygraph results were obtained in violation of his
fifth amendment right to the assistance of counsel?

3.

Did the district court erroneously dismiss Mr. Hughes' claim that his attorney rendered
ineffective assistance when he failed to provide or insure that generalized warnings of the
right against self-incrimination were given to Mr. Hughes prior to his participation in a
pre-sentence evaluation?

4.

Did the district court erroneously dismiss Mr. Hughes' claim that his trial attorney
provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a motion to suppress the
results of the polygraph test?

5.

Did the district court erroneously dismiss Mr. Hughes' claim that his attorney rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to obtain an independent, confidential
evaluation such that the evaluation could be reviewed by Mr. Hughes and his counsel
prior to the release of that information to the district court and the State?

6.

Did the district court, although correctly finding that Mr. Hughes' attorney rendered
deficient performance for failing to advise his client regarding participation in the
psychosexual evaluation, err when it incorrectly analyzed the prejudice prong of the
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and thus, erroneously dismissed that claim?

intent to dismiss must give notice of any deficiencies in the petitioner's evidence
or any legal analysis that he needs to address in order to avoid dismissal of his
action.
Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 440-441, 128 P.3d 975,977 - 978 (Ct. App. 2006.)

1.

The District Court Incorrectly Analyzed Mr. Hughes Claim That He Had The
Right Pursuant To The Sixth Amendement To The Presence Of Counsel During
All Phases Of The Psychosexual Evaluation

In his Petition, Mr. Hughes alleged his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were
violated. (R., p.8.) He further elaborated by alleging, among other claims, that his attorney was
ineffective for not being present during a polygraph, which was used to predict future
dangerousness (R., pp.8, 15, 18) and not being present during the psychosexual evaluation,
which was a critical stage and which was used to predict future dangerousness. (R., pp.9, 18-20.)
The district court held that, with regard to his request for counsel's presence during the
polygraph, "Hughes did not take a pretrial polygraph.

He did take one as part of his

psychosexual evaluation. There is no merit to this claim." (R., p.138.) The Court, however,
correctly recognized that Mr. Hughes was raising this claim pursuant to the Sixth Amendment,
and correctly determined that Mr. Hughes had the right to the assistance of counsel as articulated
in Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2007). However, because the Court thereafter
determined that no prejudice inured to Mr. Hughes, the post conviction court did not assess
whether the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel necessarily included the
presence of counsel or was limited only to the advice of counsel. By erroneously analyzing the
prejudice prong, and thereafter, failing to address the deficient performance prong, the court
erred in its analysis and subsequent dismissal of this claim.

the Sixth Amendment right to the advice of counsel was different than the Sixth Amendment
right to the assistance of counsel based on the "difference between the 'limited right to the
appointment and presence of counsel recognized as a Fifth Amendment safeguard in Miranda'
and a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel." Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562,
149 P.3d 832 (citing Estelle, 451 U.S. at 471).

This reliance is misplaced, as the Fifth

Amendment right is completely separate from, and analyzed differently than, a right to counsel
pursuant to the Sixth Amendment. Importantly, Estelle never held that the Fifth Amendment
right is more limited than the Sixth Amendment right; it never analyzed the Fifth Amendment
issue at all, because the court found the Sixth Amendment provided the constitutional basis for
the opinion.

In Estelle, the issue was whether the use of the petitioner's uncounseled and unwarned
statements obtained during a competency evaluation could be used against him during the
sentencing phase of a capital murder case to establish his future dangerousness. Estelle, 451
U.S. at 461. These allegations of error encompassed a claim that the statements were obtained in
violation of his Fifth Amendment rights because he wasn't given Miranda warnings before
engaging in the interview and a claim that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he
did not receive the "assistance of counsel before submitting to the pretrial psychiatric interview."
Id. at 461,469.

In evaluating the Sixth Amendment claim, the Court noted that Mr. Smith's "Sixth
Amendment right to counsel 'clearly had attached when Dr. Grigson examined him."' Id. at 470.
Because the court found that the interview was "conducted after adversary proceedings have
been instituted, we are not concerned in this case with the limited right to the appointment and
presence of counsel recognized as a Fifth Amendment safeguard." Id. at 471.

The Court

found that the time period in which the psychosexual evaluation occurred was a critical stage.

Id. The right to the presence of counsel applies equally to out-of-court interrogations once the
adversarial proceedings have been initiated and the client is represented by counsel. Beginning
with Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), a long line of cases reaffirmed this right. In
Massiah, the Court noted,

[AJ Constitution which guarantees a defendant the aid of counsel at such a trial
could surely vouchsafe no less to an indicted defendant under interrogation by the
police in a completely extrajudicial proceeding. Anything less, it was said, might
deny a defendant "effective representation by counsel at the only stage where
legal aid and advice would help him."
Id. at 204 (citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959)).

The Court further held that,

"the petitioner was denied the basic protections of that guarantee when there was used against
him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately
elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of counsel." Id. at 206.
In Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629-630 (1986), the court held, "The arraignment
signals 'the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings' and thus the attachment of the Sixth
Amendment, thereafter, government efforts to elicit information from the accused, including
interrogation, represent 'critical stages' at which the Sixth Amendment applies." Moreover, the
Court reiterated that once counsel was requested, the client need not renew that request, "[WJe
presume that the defendant requests the lawyer's services at every critical stage of the
prosecution. We thus reject the State's suggestion that respondents' requests for the appointment
of counsel should be construed to apply only to representation in formal legal proceedings." Id. at
633. The Court further explained that it would apply the presumption because the right to
counsel did not turn upon a request for counsel, but instead continued without renewal following
the initial appointment. Id.

The Court noted that a request for counsel was "an extremely

performed by the judge, as part of the formal sentencing hearing. Functionally,
the investigation is part of the sentencing procedure.
Id. at 300 (citing State ex rel. Russell v. Jones, 647 P.2d 904, 906 (Or. 1982)). In Jones, the

court held that the "defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel to the same degree when the
judge seeks sentencing information from him in open court as when the judge does so indirectly
through the out-of-court agency of a probation officer." Jones, 647 P.2d at 906. Certainly,
Mr. Hughes was as entitled to counsel in this extra-judicial hearing as he would have been had
the court attempted to elicit this information during court.

4.

The District Court, Although Recognizing That Mr. Hughes Had Asserted A
Sixth Amendment Right To The Presence Of Counsel During The Psychosexual
And Polygraph Evaluation, Did Not Address This Claim Of Deficient
Performance, Instead, Finding Only That Preiudice Did Not Inure To Mr. Hughes

In the case at bar, Mr. Hughes alleged that his counsel failed to adequately represent him
by not being present during the psychological evaluation4, which was used to predict future
dangerousness. 5

(R., pp.8-9, 18-20).

The court found this factual allegation to be true.

(R., p.148.) Mr. Hughes further asserted that the psychosexual evaluation and the polygraph, to

4

Although Mr. Hughes appears to generally assert the right to the presence of counsel, for
purposes of his case, it is analyzed under both the Fifth and Sixth Amendement. As noted in
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625,633, (1986), "Although judges and lawyers may understand
and appreciate the subtle distinctions between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel,
the average person does not. When an accused requests an attorney, either before a police officer
or a magistrate, he does not know which constitutional right he is invoking; he therefore should
not be expected to articulate exactly why or for what purposes he is seeking counsel. It makes
little sense to afford relief from further interrogation to a defendant who asks a police officer for
an attorney, but permit further interrogation to a defendant who makes an identical request to a
judge. The simple fact that defendant has requested an attorney indicates that he does not believe
that he is sufficiently capable of dealing with his adversaries singlehandedly." Id. at Fn. 7
~internal citations omitted).
While the client calls it a "psychological evaluation," it is clear that he is referencing the
psychosexual evaluation, as the psychosexual evalauation is the only evaluation the court
ordered. The district court also treated claims alleging errors in the "psychological" evaluation
-- -----~ -11.-.. ..... : .... ,.... +..-.. +ho. "..-..c,u,-,.h.n.c--Avm:::al Pu!:'!ln~tinn " (R __

nn.113-154.)

5.

The District Court Incorrectly Analyzed The Prejudice Prong Of Mr. Hughes'
Claim Oflneffective Assistance Of Counsel

Mr. Hughes alleged that he was deprived of the presence of counsel during the
psychosexual evaluation, which was a critical stage. (R., pp.8, 19.) The court, also found that
Mr. Hughes claim that his attorney was not present during the psychosexual evaluation,
including the polygraph, was "uncontroverted," and thus, determined that it was true.
(R., p.148.) However, the court did not distinguish whether its findings applied to a Fifth or
Sixth Amendment violation and additionally, instead of analyzing the presence of counsel issue
under either claim, the district court erroneously found that no prejudice inured to Mr. Hughes
and thus, provided no further analysis of the deficient performance claim. (R., pp. 148-154.)
In addition to showing deficient performance under the first prong of Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 687, a petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must also demonstrate that defense
counsel's deficiency resulted in prejudice. Id. The prejudice prong of the test is established if
there is a reasonable probability that, "but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. "A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome." Id. In Estrada, the Idaho Supreme
Court found that the prejudice prong was met, where:
The sentencing judge's specific, repeated references to the psychosexual
evaluation suggest that it did play an important role in the sentencing. While we
do not pass judgment in any way on whether the sentence actually imposed on
Estrada was unreasonable or excessive, nevertheless, Estrada has met his burden
of showing that the evaluation played a role in his sentence. Therefore, Estrada
has demonstrated prejudice as a result of his attorney's failure to advise him of his
Fifth Amendment rights.
Id. at 565, 149 P.3d at 840. Thus, Estrada was not required to show that a different sentence

would have been imposed, only that the evaluation played a role in the sentence. Here, the
prejudice suffered by Mr. Hughes was twofold: he was forced to participate in the psychosexual

Mr. Hughes asserts that because he had a Sixth Amendment right to the presence of
counsel during the psychosexual evaluation, and such counsel was not present, the presence of
counsel was denied altogether at a critical stage, thus justifying a presumption of prejudice.
The presumption of prejudice in these contexts is justified because the failure to have
counsel at a critical stage renders the proceeding unfair. Id. Additionally, "if counsel entirely
fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a
denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively
unreliable." Id.

Further, "the Court has uniformly found constitutional error without any

showing of prejudice when counsel was either totally absent or prevented from assisting the
accused during a critical stage of the proceeding." Id.
A presumption of prejudice is also warranted because it is "not mandatory for the
sentencing court to set forth reasons for the imposition of a particular sentence." State v.
Martinsen, 128 Idaho 472,475, 915 P.2d 34, 37 (Ct. App. 1996). Thus, a defendant has no way

of knowing whether or to what extent, the district court considered any improperly obtained
evidence. Even where the court does articulate the reasons for a sentence, there is no way to
know if those reasons are illustrative, comprehensive, or simply those that the court relied upon
most. This results in a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment with no possible
remedy.
Finally, the reason for applying a presumption of prejudice is to avoid exactly the
scenario that arose in this case - a game of semantics in deciding that while the
unconstitutionally obtained psychosexual evaluation played "some" role at sentencing, it did not
play an "important" role at sentencing, because in comparing this case with Estrada, the district
court in Mr. Hughes' case referenced and quoted from the unconstitutionally obtained

found that clearly the psychosexual evaluation played some role in sentencing, because the
sentencing court referenced the evaluation on two occasions in imposing sentence, but concluded
that based on information not derived from the evaluation, the information from the
psychosexual evaluation it did not have a sufficiently negative impact on the sentence imposed to
justify a finding of prejudice. (R., pp.151-154.)
At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, after Mr. Hughes had indicated to the district
court that he would like to obtain a second psychosexual evaluation at his own expense, the State
objected, arguing that the current evaluation was very thorough and "sets forth a number of
factors that are negative to the defendant but that doesn't entitle him to go picking and choosing
who he gets to go see for an evaluation." (Tr. 30823, p.5, Ls.17-21.) Then, during its sentencing
argument, the State argued that the community needed to be protected from Mr. Hughes, "who's
a career sex offender who cannot and will not be treated." (Tr. 30823, 3/26/04, p.13, Ls.24-25.)
The prosecutor further classified Mr. Hughes as maintaining "a successful career of remaining
below the legal radar as he has manipulated and abused a number of girls." (Tr. 30823, p.14,
Ls.6-8.)

The State next referenced Mr. Hughes "most recent evaluation," arguing that it

"concludes that he is not amenable to outpatient treatment. He is not rehabi!itatable [sic] at this
time. He is a huge risk to society." (Tr. 30823, p.21, Ls.21-24.) Thus, the State's argument for
the imposition of incarceration, rather than probation, was based, in part, on the negative
information in the psychosexual evaluation.
As the post conviction court recognized, the sentencing court referenced Mr. Hughes'
psychosexual evaluation on two occasions in rendering the sentence. First, the sentencing court
stated:
According to the evaluation performed by Mr. McCarroll, he diagnoses
you as having an adult antisocial personality disorder. What adult antisocial

opposite - that Mr. Hughes did not take personal responsibility for the sexual relationship. (PSI,
p.31.) Thus, for the post conviction court to conclude that the psychosexual evaluation, as it
related to remorse, "had no effect" when the district court considered the sentence to impose,
was erroneous.
Additionally, what the post conviction court failed to recognize in denying Mr. Hughes'
claim, is that there was other detrimental information, contained only within the psychosexual
evaluation, which was before the sentencing court and considered by the district court when
deciding what sentence to impose.

The sentencing court read Mr. Hughes' psychosexual

evaluation in detail, as the sentencing court did reference it on two occasions. (Tr. 30823, p.39,
Ls.10-20, p.43, L.15-p.44, L.l, p.45, Ls.12-20.) What we do not specifically know, is the extent
to which the other detrimental information, which could only be derived from the psychosexual
evaluation, was considered by the sentencing court imposing the twenty-five to life aggregate
sentence upon the 57 year old defendant.
At two points in the sentencing hearing, the sentencing court referenced Mr. Hughes'
alleged previous criminal conduct, upon which he had never been convicted. Early in rendering
its decision, the sentencing court observed:
First, the first factor I am to consider is whether the defendant's criminal conduct
neither caused nor threatened harm. In this case I expressly find as a matter of
fact that this criminal defendant's behavior did pose and threaten harm and in fact
result in harm both to the victim in this case and the victims in other cases before
him.
(Tr. 30823, p.38, Ls.18-24.) This information came primarily from the psychosexual evaluation,
not the PSI. The PSI mentions one other alleged victim from 1974, K.C., although there were no
criminal charges filed. (PSI, p.9.) The PSI also references one other self-disclosed investigation
for abuse stemming from a daycare Mr. Hughes ran with his then-wife. (R., p.9.) In contrast,

he did not sexually abuse any other children other than [P.M.). However, he
responded deceptively to any more under age victims.
(PSI, p.31.) Then, in determining that Mr. Hughes did not meet any of the requirements for
outpatient treatment, the psychosexual evaluator used Mr. Hughes lack of "willingness to be
honest on his polygraph" and reluctance to take the polygraph without speaking to his attorney.
(PSI, p.31.)

Thus, the polygraph was a significant factor for at least two issues in the

psychosexual evaluation, allegations of prior misconduct and Mr. Hughes' amenability to
outpatient treatment. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the sentencing court did not consider
the psychosexual evaluation, including the polygraph result, in imposing sentence, especially
considering its repeated references to Mr. Hughes alleged prior misconduct with younger victims
than P.M. Therefore, in determining whether to place Mr. Hughes on probation or incarcerate
him, the evaluation played some role.
Additionally, it is the evaluation that places Mr. Hughes in either the "low/moderate" or
"moderate" category as his risk level for reoffense. (PSI, p.28.) It is the evaluation, not the PSI,
that lists only one positive factor, comprising one sentence, "that he was sorry," and five
negative factors that take a full page to detail. (PSI, pp.30-31.) Moreover, Mr. Hughes' criminal
history didn't establish that he was a "career sex offender,'' as argued by the State, when such
criminal history consisted of two (2) misdemeanor DUI's one (1) petit theft, and a dismissed
charge of a sexual crime against a child. (PSI, p.5.)
There may well have been additional, untainted evidence which might have justified the
sentence imposed; indeed, the post conviction court so found. (R., pp.150-154.) For example,
the facts of the crimes to which Mr. Hughes pied guilty may have justified the sentence imposed.
Regardless, so long as the district court relied on unconstitutionally-obtained evidence in

II.
The District Court Incorrectly Analyzed Mr. Hughes' Claim That His Attorney Rendered
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel When Counsel Failed To Move To Suppress The
Psychosexual Evaluation Because The Polygraph Results Were Obtained In Violation Of His
Fifth Amendment Right To The Assistance Of Counsel

A.

Introduction
Mr. Hughes asserts that the district court erroneously analyzed this claim because, despite

finding that Mr. Hughes was entitled to Fifth Amendment protections during the psychosexual
evaluation, which included the polygraph, the district court incorrectly determined that
Mr. Hughes did not suffer any prejudice as a result of the lack of counsel and thus, did not
address Mr. Hughes' specific claim that the psychosexual evaluation should have been
suppressed because it relied on the polygraph, which was obtained in violation of his Fif1h
Amendment right to the presence of counsel.

B.

The District Court Incorrectly Analyzed Mr. Hughes' Claim That His Attorney Rendered
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel When Counsel Failed To Move To Suppress The
Psychosexual Evaluation Because The Polygraph Results Were Obtained In Violation Of
His Fifth Amendment Right To The Assistance Of Counsel
In his petition, Mr. Hughes alleged that his attorney was ineffective for not being present

during the polygraph, which violated his right against self-incrimination and was used to predict
future dangerousness, and, therefore, violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
(R., pp.8-9, 18-20). He further alleged that "[his] attorney never objected at sentence. The
polygraph should have been suppressed in court." (R., p.15.)

When I was asked to take a polygraph, I told the police officer I did not want to
take it, at least not without a lawyer present. The officers continued to badger me
until I succumbed and took the test without an attorney present. Questioning in
the polygraph concerned incidents which had occurred thirty years ago rather than
the crime of which I was accused. At the sentencing hearing, the results of the
polygraph were among the things used to predict my future dangerousness, which
was in tum a significant factor in the heavy sentence which I received. My
attorney did not challenge the use of the polygraph.
(R., pp.116-117.) Mr. Hughes' statement is further supported by the psychosexual evaluation

("Note-prior to participating in his polygraph on 2/11/04, Derrick stated he did not want to take
the scheduled polygraph ... ") (Psychosexual evaluation, p.10.)

He further clarified that the

information was erroneously used to enhance his sentence. (R., p.33.) The State's response was
as follows:
Petitioner did not take a 'pretrial pollygraph.' A polygraph was part of his
psychosexual evaluation, and was performed to determine if he was truthful in his
disclosures. Exhibit 4 demonstrates that petitioner was advised of his rights and
he waived his rights after indicating he understood them. Petitioner does not
indicate in his allegation that he asked for counsel, or was refused the right to
counsel, or even chose to not have counsel during the polygraph; he merely states
there was no counsel present during the polygraph.
(R., p.68 (errors in original).) The State simply disregards Mr. Hughes' assertions that he
requested counsel, arguing, "Petitioner does not indicate in his allegation that he asked for
counsel, or was refused the right to counsel, or even chose to not have counsel during the
polygraph." (R., p.63.) Additionally, the State never addressed the claim under the Fifth
Amendment - that if Mr. Hughes factual allegations were taken as true, he had invoked his right
to counsel and any further questioning was done in violation of his Fifth Amendment right.
Importantly, the State never provided any evidence on the substance of the "warnings" that
Mr. Hughes allegedly received. As such, there was a material issue of genuine fact regarding

whether Mr. Hughes did, in fact, invoke his right to counsel, and if so, did that occur before or
after the "warnings."

the examiner.

This latter examination clearly implicated his Fifth Amendment rights."

(R., p.150.)
Moreover, because Mr. Hughes requested counsel during a custodial interrogation, and
that request for counsel was not honored, had a motion to suppress been filed, Mr. Hughes would
likely have prevailed upon the motion.

C.

Because Mr. Hughes Was Subjected To A Custodial Interrogation After He Requested
Counsel, There Were Likely Grounds Upon Which To Suppress The Polygraph
Examination

In order to show his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file
a motion to suppress, the appellate courts examine "the probability of success of such a motion."
Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 976 P.2d 927 (] 999). It is apparent that Mr. Hughes' trial

counsel never objected to, or moved to suppress the results of the polygraph test, which was
given despite Mr. Hughes' requests to speak with his attorney (Tr. 30823, pp.3 - 48), and that
counsel had notice of that error through, at a minimum, the comment in the psychosexual
evaluation. (PSI, p.31.) Because Mr. Hughes was questioned, despite his request to speak with
his attorney and have his attorney be present during the polygraph, his trial counsel was deficient
for failing to object or move to suppress the results of the polygraph examination. See Arizona v.
Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 677 (1988) (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 (1981)

(holding that "a suspect who has 'expressed his desire to deal with the police only through
counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities unless the accused himself
initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police."')).
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that a defendant
has a constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. U.S. CONST amend. V. "The Fifth
Amendment privilege is 'as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard ... "' Estelle v.

standard and the request must be clear and unequivocal and may not be ambiguous. Davis v.

United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462 (1994) (suspect's statement that "maybe I should talk to a
lawyer" was not an assertion of the right to counsel); State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 853, 26 P.3d
31, 36 (2001).
Mr. Hughes did request counsel prior to participating in the polygraph. (R., pp.8-9, 15.)
While the State moved for summary dismissal,
Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised
no genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would
entitle the applicant to the relief requested. A material fact has "some logical
connection with the consequential facts [,]" Black's Law Dictionary, 991 (7th
Ed.1999), and therefore is determined by its relationship to the legal theories
presented by the parties. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary
hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759,763,819 P.2d 1159,
1163 (Ct.App.1991). However, summary dismissal may be appropriate even
where the State does not controvert the applicant's evidence because the court is
not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations,
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law.
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct.App.1994).

State v. Yakovac, 180 P.3d 476,483 (Ct. App. 2008.)

I.

Mr. Hughes Was In Custody For Purposes Of The Polygraph Examination

During the time of the polygraph, Mr. Hughes was housed in the county jail prior to, and
after, the polygraph. (R., 30823, pp. 39-44; 48-49; (Tr. 3/26/2004, p. 7, Ls. 2-3 ("One of the
problems is that Mr. Hughes has been incarcerated for a substantial period of time.")
(Psychosexual evaluation, p.l, "Derrick has been incarcerated at the Twin Falls County Jail since
2003") (Polygraph Report, p.l, "Derrick first told me he is presently in jail awaiting
sentencing.")). Thus, for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, Mr. Hughes was in custody during
the polygraph.

See also State v. Curless, 137 Idaho 138, 44 P.3d 1193 (Ct. App. 2002)

Additionally, after Mr. Hughes "indicated deception," there was a follow-up interrogation
to "provide clarification or new disclosures." (PSI, p.33.) The polygraph was done as part of the
psychosexual evaluation (PSI, p.27), and had Mr. Hughes disclosed any yet-uncharged
misconduct, that evidence would have been turned over to the State, as the psychosexual
evaluation was provided to pre-sentence investigator, the State and the Court. (R., 30823, p.5.)
Moreover, the psychosexual evaluator would have had a statutory obligation to tum over that
information and if he didn't, the PSI investigator certainly would have. (See Idaho Code § 161619, requiring "(a]ny physician, resident on a hospital staff, intern, nurse, coroner, school
teacher, day care personnel, social worker, or other person having reason to believe that a child
under the age of eighteen ( 18) years has been abused," must report that abuse or face
misdemeanor charges). Accordingly, Mr. Hughes was subjected to an interrogation.
3.

The Psychosexual Evaluator And Therefore, The Polygraph Examiner, Were
State Actors For Purposes Of The Fifth Amendment

The final element to determine whether Mr. Hughes was entitled to Fifth Amendment
protections during the polygraph depends on whether the person conducting the interrogation
was a state actor. State v. Heritage, 95 P.3d 345,349 (Wash. 2004) (citing State v. Sargent, 762
P.Zd 1127 (1988).
The district court ordered a psychosexual evaluation, "In this matter I believe it is also
necessary and appropriate for me to enter an order for the preparation of a psychosexual
evaluation by a qualified ATSA approved provider." (Tr., November 21, 2003, p.31, Ls.11-14.)
In this case, the psychosexual evaluation was conducted by Mark Annas, a Clinical Consultant
with McNeil and Associates. (Psychosexual Eval, p.1.) Mr. Annas, in turn, selected William
Walter to conduct the polygraph. (PSI, p.27.) Thus, the polygrapher was a person designated by

suppression because it was obtained in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
Because the State erroneously analyzed this issue (R., pp.72-73) and the court granted the State's
Motion to Dismiss in its entirety (R., p.133), there is a strong probability a motion to suppress
would have been successful.

However, because the resolution of this issue is necessarily

predicated on factual findings regarding the invocation and possible waiver, this issue must be
remanded to the district court for appropriate factual findings.
D.

Mr. Hughes Has Also Established The Prejudice Prong For A Claim Of Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel
The prejudice suffered by Mr. Hughes was twofold: he was forced to participate in the

psychosexual evaluation when he was not required to and the evaluation resulted in prejudicial
information which was used to justify the imposition of a more harsh sentence than he would
have otherwise received. The post conviction court found that,
Judge Hohnhorst had reviewed both [the psychosexual evaluation and the
presentence investigation report.]
The PSI investigator relied upon the
psychosexual evaluation in making her recommendation that Hughes be
sentenced to a period of incarceration ... She stated that 'He is not amenable for
treatment, according to his evaluation, and therefore would continue to present a
risk to the community.' This conclusion mirrored that of the evaluation report:
'Derrick Hughes does not meet any of the requirements for out patient treatment
(personal responsibility, empathy, willingness to be honest on his polygraph) and
is not amenable to out-patient treatment.
(R., p.151.)
Additionally, the psychosexual evaluator relied upon the polygraph to determine
Mr. Hughes future dangerousness.

(PSI, pp.22-31.)

When Mr. Annas commented on

Mr. Hughes lack of amenability to treatment and his future dangerousness, "his role changed and
became essentially like that of an agent of the State recounting unwarned statements made in a
post arrest custodial setting."

Id.

Thus, because the psychosexual was so tainted by the

B.

The District Court Erred In Dismissing Mr. Hughes' Claim That His Attorney Rendered
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel When He Failed To Insure That Mr. Hughes Was
Provided Miranda Warnings Prior To The Commencement Of The Presentence
Investigation Report
The district court dismissed Mr. Hughes' claim that "counsel did not make sure defendant

had his Miranda rights read to him prior to his PSI investigation." (R., p.143.) The court
characterizes this claim as a failure to "warn him of the more general privilege against selfincrimination under the Fifth Amendment in post plea proceedings and that therefore his Fifth
Amendment rights were violated." (R., p.143.) The post conviction court, while noting that the
Fifth Amendment applies to pre-sentence investigation reports, found that pursuant to Stuart v.
State, 144 Idaho 467, 180 P.2d 506 (2008), because the presentence investigation did not

constitute a critical stage, even if trial counsel did fail to advise Mr. Hughes about his Fifth
Amendment rights, it would not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., p.144.) The
post conviction court alternatively found that Mr. Hughes waived his Fifth Amendment
protections. (R., p.144.) These findings were erroneous.
Mr. Hughes asserts that because he was entitled to generalized warnings regarding his
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and because the holding in Stuart is incorrect,
this Court hold that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to
properly advise Mr. Hughes of his rights prior to the PSI. Additionally, because Mr. Hughes can
demonstrate prejudice suffered as a result of the deficient performance, this Court should find his
attorney provided ineffective assistance.

recognized exceptions. Id. at 143-144, 44 P.3d at 1198-1199. The court found that although
Mr. Curless was in custody for purposes of a Fifth Amendment analysis, he was not subjected to
an interrogation because, "the questioning did not take place in a police station and was not
conducted by police personnel. Rather, the evaluator who did the questioning in this case was a
neutral party appointed by the district court pursuant to LC.§ 18-8316." Id, at 144, 44 P.3d at
1199. The court did find, however, that "presentence investigations are usually conducted by
state agents." Id. at 145, 44 P.3d at 1200. The court also found that Mr. Curless was not
threatened with a penalty if he failed to participate in the evaluation and thus, the second
exception did not apply. Id. The remaining holding in Curless, that the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel does not apply to psychosexual evaluations was overruled by Estrada v. State, 143
Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2007). Thus, one of the factors the Curless court relied on was the
status of the individual providing the evaluation. As noted below, Mr. Hughes asserts that the
individual performing the presentence investigation report is not a neutral party, but rather, is an
individual with an adversarial role, similar to law enforcement.

2.

Stuart v. State Should Be Overruled Because It Erroneously Decided There Was
Not A Sixth Amendment Right To The Assistance Of Counsel In A Presentence
Interview

The issue in Stuart was whether the district court erred in dismissing Mr. Stuart's post
conviction claim that he was provided with ineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel
failed to consult with him regarding the presentence investigation report. Id. at 468, 180 P .3d at
507. The Stuart Opinion erroneously concluded that the PSI was not a critical stage, and thus,

Mr. Stuart had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel such that trial counsel could not have
rendered ineffective assistance. Id. at 145 Idaho 471, 180 P.3d at 510. Estrada held there was a
Sixth Amendment right "up through conviction or entry of a guilty plea, and would also be

"possibility of prejudice to the defendant's interests." Stuart, 145 Idaho at 470, 180 P.3d at 509.
The concurrence opines that the majority's decision characterized PSI's as "routine" when they
"[delve] into information that for the most part is available in public records." Id. at 471, 180
P.3d at 510. No such PSI exists in Idaho, as all PSI's include information that is in-depth and
personal and is potentially violative of the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights, which is
certainly "possibly prejudicial to the defendant's interests."

a.

The Stuart Opinion Is In Error In That The Decision Holds That The
Presentence Information Gathering Process Is Not A Critical Stage Of The
Prosecution

The Stuart Opinion relies primarily on three grounds to conclude that the information
gathering process of the presentence investigation is not a critical stage.

The first is that,

"Although the [Idaho Supreme] Court was not directly addressing the issue, the [Idaho Supreme]
Court appears to have indicated that a 'routine' presentence investigation is not a critical stage."
Id. at 470, 180 P.3d at 509. Second, the Stuart Court relied on distinguishable federal and state

cases which held that the presentence investigation is not a critical stage. Third, the court noted
that Mr. Stuart "has not distinguished his presentence investigation from any other routine
presentence investigation."

Id.

Thereafter, the Stuart Court held that, "Stuart's routine

presentence interview was not a critical stage of the adversarial proceedings." Id. at 471, 180
P.3d at 510.

1.

Definition Of A Critical Stage

The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that a Sixth Amendment right exists in the
interim period between the finding of guilt and the sentencing hearing. In Estrada v. State, 143
Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006). The Court stated:

preparation (are) vitally important, the defendants ... (are) as much entitled to such aid (of
counsel) during that period as the trial itself." Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205
(1964) (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932)). Put another way, critical stages are
those "pretrial procedures that would impair defense on the merits if the accused is required to
proceed without counsel." Gertstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1975).

ii.

The Defendant Has A Due Process Right In The Preparation Of
Sentencing

Just as a defendant has a due process right in the trial, so too, does a defendant have a due
process right in the sentencing procedure; "[t]he sentencing process, as well as the trial itself,
must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause." Garner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,358
(1977). One of the reasons is that:
to the extent such recommendations are influential in determining the resulting
sentence, the necessity for aid of counsel in marshalling the facts, introducing
evidence of mitigating circumstances and in general aiding and assisting the
defendant to present his case as to sentence is apparent. Even more important in a
case such as this is the fact that certain legal rights may be lost if not exercised at
this stage.
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967). This is because, "the defendant has a legitimate
interest in the character of the procedure which leads to the imposition of sentence even if he
may have no right to object to a particular result of the sentencing process." Garner, 430 U.S. at
358.

(a.)

The Defendant Has The Same Rights During The
Presentence Investigation Process As Those Protected At
Sentencing

If the pretrial procedures are protected by the Sixth Amendment to insure the Due
Process requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are met, (Powell, 287 U.S. at 6971,) then, concomitantly, to afford due process protection in the sentencing proceeding, the Sixth

psychiatric examination of the defendant, despite the fact that neither party requested it. Id. The
doctor interviewed the defendant for about 90 minutes and provided a letter to the court
regarding the defendant's competency. Id. At sentencing, over objection from the defense, this
doctor was allowed to testify as to the defendant's future dangerousness, one of the elements the
State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to obtain a valid death sentence. Id. at
457-458.
In analyzing whether the defendant had the right to effective assistance of counsel
pursuant to the 6th Amendment, the United States Supreme Court found that the doctor's
conclusion regarding the defendant's future dangerousness was drawn "largely from
respondent's account of the crime during their interview, and he placed particular emphasis on
what he considered to be respondent's lack of remorse." Id. at 464. And,
That respondent was questioned by a psychiatrist designated by the trial court to
conduct a neutral competency examination, rather than by a police officer,
government informant, or prosecuting attorney is immaterial. ... During the
psychiatric evaluation, respondent assuredly was "faced with a phase of the
adversary system" and was "not in the presence of [a) perso[n) acting solely in his
interest."
Id. at 467. Ultimately, in determining that a Sixth Amendment right existed, the Court held:
Since [1932), we have held that the right to counsel granted by the Sixth
Amendment means that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer "at or after the
time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him ...
whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information,
or arraignment."
Id. (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S., at 226-227.) The Court further explained:

It is central to [the Sixth Amendment] principle that in addition to counsel's
presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that the need not stand alone against
the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where
counsel's absence might derogate from the acused's right to a fair trial.
Id. at 469-470 (footnote omitted in original) (emphasis added).

(b.)

In Idaho, The Preparation Of The PSI Is A Critical Stage

The completion of Presentence Investigation Reports is governed by Idaho Criminal Rule
32. Rule 32 does not require the defendant's participation. See I.C.R. 32, and Estrada, 143
Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006). As noted by the American Probation and Parole Association:
The primary purpose of the pre-sentence report is to provide the sentencing court
with succinct and precise information upon which to base a rational sentencing
decision. Potential use of the report by other agencies in the correctional process
should be recognized as a factor in determining the content and length of the
report but should be subordinated to its primary purpose.
American Probation and Parole Association. 8 In State v. Cornwall, 95 Idaho 680, 5.18
P.2d 863 (1974), the Idaho Supreme Court noted:
To begin a discussion of the requirements of a presentence report's
recommendation for rehabilitation, the purpose of the presentence report must be
defined. One of the best definitions is that,
'No single instrument in our hands so neatly typifies the modern correctional
philosophy as does the presentence report. Its only reason for being is to depict
the intimate dynamics of one particular individual offender and to enable the court
to dispose of his case with a tailor-made plan that is corrective in intent, whereas
without such knowledge the disposition can only be punitive.'

Id. at 686, 518 P.2d at 869 (internal citation omitted).
In Idaho, Presentence Investigation Reports are exclusively completed by probation
officers, who are employees of the Department of Corrections, which is part of law enforcement
in the Executive Branch.9 The purpose of the PSI is to assist the court in sentencing, the primary
goal of which is protection of society. State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 495, 129 P.3d 1241,
1244 (2006).

8

www.appa-net.org, last visited on November 11, 2008.
http://corrections.state.id.us/about_us/overview.htm;http://www.state.id.us/govemment/
executive.html, last visited on November 11, 2008.
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a individual had a Fifth Amendment right to refuse to participate in a psychosexual evaluation.
(Estrada, p.5.) In particular, the court noted:

The presentence report relies greatly on information already available in public
records, such as educational background, residence history, and employment
information. In contrast, a psychosexual evaluation like the one Estrada faced is
more in-depth and personal, and includes an inquiry into the defendant's sexual
history, with verification by polygraph being highly recommended. Because of
the nature of the information sought, a defendant is more likely to make
incriminating statements during a psychosexual evaluation than during a routine
presentence investigation. As the district court in this case concluded, 'the
psychosexual evaluation contained information concerning Estrada's future
dangerousness.'
143 Idaho at 526, 149 P.3d at 837 (internal citation omitted).
Thus, what the Estrada Court held was that a psychosexual evaluation was potentially
more violative of an individual's Fifth Amendment right than a presentence investigation; there

was no determination made as to whether the presentence investigation was also potentially
violative of the Fifth Amendment right.
The Estrada Court, in making this determination focused on the nature of the information
being gathered, distinguishing between information "already available in public records" and
"more in-depth and personal information." Id. Notably, if the information is already public
information, there is no need for the defendant to provide this information. This is consistent
with the language of Idaho Criminal Rule 32, which does not mandate cooperation by the
defendant • such cooperation is apparently unnecessary if such information can be gathered
independently or is otherwise available as public information. In contrast, information that was
"in-depth and personal" and, therefore, could only be obtained from the individual, would be
more likely to implicate the Fifth Amendment rights during the information gathering process of
the psychosexual evaluation.

The Estrada Court's focus, then, in determining whether the

psychosexual evaluation constituted a critical stage, was to protect the defendant from disclosing

Id. Herein lies the problem with concluding that Idaho's PSI's are "routine," but not analyzing

whether the information gathered pursuant to ICR 32 is in-depth and personal. Since 1979, when
ICR 32 was created, the development of caselaw and federal and state law has rendered much of
LC.R. 32 information "in-depth and personal" rather than "public," thus precluding its definition
as "routine." For example, under ICR 32(b)(1 ), the defendant can only be compelled to provide
information regarding "the defendant's version of events" that mirrors the charging language to
which he pied guilty, i.e., information that could be inquired into at the time of the guilty plea to
insure a valid guilty plea. State v. Wilkins, 125 Idaho at 215, 868 P.2d at 1234. Attempting to
elicit more information than essentially a reiteration of the charging document language could
amount to compelling the client to "testify[ ] to matters that went well beyond the facts of the
case," and would be a violation of the client's Fifth Amendment right. Id. at 218. This fact was
recognized by the sentencing court in the case at bar, when Mr. Hughes wished to "address the
court as to his reasons for pleading guilty in this case (Tr. 30823, 11/21/2003, p.5, L.24-p.4, L. l),
the district court responded by explaining what he would permit Mr. Hughes to do, stating, "But,
it would not be my intention to ask him to elaborate on whether or not the facts as stated here ask him to State the facts beyond agreeing or disagreeing that the statements contained in the
Indictment are accurate." (Tr. 30823, 11/21/2003, p.7, Ls.5-9.)
Idaho Criminal Rule 32(b)(4) requires the inclusion of the educational background of the
client. The Estrada Court also characterized this information as public information. Id. at 5. In
fact, educational background and history is not public information.
The Federal Education Records and Privacy Act (FERPA), commonly known as
the Buckley Amendment, requires that any school or institution that receives
federal funds for education may not release school records or any other personally
identifiable information without the prior consent of the student, with a few

Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (hereinafter, HIPAA), which precludes the
disclosure, with exceptions of"individual indentifiable health infonnation:"
The Privacy Rule protects all "individually identifiable health infonnation" held
or transmitted by a covered entity or its business associate, in any fonn or media,
whether electronic, paper or oral. The Privacy Rule calls this infonnation
"protected health information" (PHI).
Individually indentifiable health
information is information, including demographic data, that relates to:
The individuals past, present or future physical or mental health or condition;
The provision of healthcare to the individual;
The past present or future payment for provision of health service to the
individual;
and that identifies the individual or for which there is a reasonable basis to believe
can be used to identify the individual. Individually identifiable health information
includes many common identifiers (eg. name, address, birthdate, Social Security
Number.)
Sununary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, OCR Privacy Brief, Department of Health and Human
Services, last revised May, 2003. 10
Financial information is also not public information and can be released only through
court order for specific purposes. (See 15 U.S.C. § 6801 et. seq.) Additionally:
The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 protects the confidentiality of
personal financial records by creating a statutory Fourth Amendment protection
for bank records. The Act was essentially a reaction to the U.S. Supreme Court's
1976 ruling in United States v. Miller, where the Court found that bank customers
had no legal right to privacy in financial infonnation held by financial institutions.
425 U.S. 435 (1976). Generally, the RFPA requires that federal government
agencies provide individuals with a notice and an opportunity to object before a
bank or other specified institution can disclose personal financial information to a
federal government agency, often for law enforcement purposes ....
The RFPA sates that "no Government authority may have access to or obtain
copies of, or the information contained in the financial records of any customer
from a financial institution unless the financial records are reasonably described"
and

circumstance in which the Fifth Amendment applies. Having the advice of counsel during the
information gathering process of the presentence investigation could avoid some of that
prejudice.
At either the entry of the guilty plea or the finding of guilt, the defendant is given a PSI
questiormaire that requires the defendant to provide information regarding the categories as set
forth in I.C.R. 32. I.C.R. 32. The PSI can also include various evaluations. I.C.R. 32.
Following the completion of the PSI questiormaire, the defendant has a face-to-face
interview with the investigator, at which time the TCU instrument and the LSI-R assessment tool
are given to the defendant. The TCU instrument measures substance abuse and the LSI-R
assesses what types of programming are relevant in the correctional setting. (Idaho Department
of Correction Operations Programs Division (hereinafter, IDOC Operations), 2006.) 11 While the
PSI in Mr. Hughes' case was done before the adoption of the LSI-Rand the TCU, nevertheless,
other testing was done as part of the psychosexual evaluation, such as the Static 99, Prasor, SVR
20, Mental Status Examination, Personality Assessment Inventory and the polygraph.
(Psychosexual evaluation, p.2.) Thereafter, the investigator will take the questiormaire, confirm
or verify as much of the information as possible, request additional clarification or information
from the defendant. (IDOC Operations, p.10.) Notably, "The investigation includes an interview
that includes personal, criminal, demographic and family information for the sentencing court.
This information provides in-depth and insightful offender information for the presiding court."
(IDOC Operations, p. l 0, emphasis added).
Thus, the PSI is comprised of information which does not require the defendant to engage
in in-depth and personal self disclosure, which can also be public information, and information

11 ,.....,

reasons for providing Sixth Amendment protections. Because, "incrimination is implicated not
just when additional charges could be filed, but also when punishment could be enh.:inced as a
result of the defendant's statements," the client is entitled to the protection of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. Estrada, 143 Idaho 564, 149 P .3d at 839 (citing Pens v. Bail, 902
F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1989)).
Because of the Fifth Amendment implications, the PSI information gathering process is a
"particular confrontation" in which there is a "potential substantial prejudice to the defendant's
rights" and "the ability of counsel [can] help avoid that prejudice." Estrada, 143 Idaho 562, 149
P.3d at 837 (citing Wade, 338 U.S. at 227). As such, when the Stuart court concluded that the
information gathering process of the presentence investigation process was not a critical stage of
the prosecution for which defendants are entitled to counsel, it did so in violation of controlling
state and federal law, and as such, was erroneous and this Court should overrule that case.

c.

The Stuart Opinion Erroneously Relied On Distinguishable Federal And
State Cases Which Held That The Presentence Investigation Stage Of The
Prosecution Is Not A Critical Stage

In the Opinion, the Court states, "The majority of other courts to directly address this
issue agree with the indication in Estrada.

Several federal courts have held that a routine

presentence investigation is not a critical stage of the proceedings in a non-capital
case .... Furthermore, many state courts have likewise concluded that a non-capital presentence
investigation is not a critical stage." (Stuart v. State, 145 Idaho 467, 470, 180 P.3d 506, 509
(2008) (internal citations omitted)). While correct, the cases cited have been superceded by
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(b)(2). Additionally, more recent state court decisions
indicate that the trend is to treat the presentence interview as a critical stage of the proceedings.

the defendant to provide information which will be used in preparation of
the presentence investigation. This procedure, which generally mirrors the
approach in the Model Local Rule for Guideline Sentencing, supra, is intended to
maximize judicial economy by providing for more orderly sentencing hearings
while also providing fair opportunity for both parties to review, object to, and
comment upon, the probation officer's report in advance of the sentencing
hearing.
(emphasis added). The Committee further found that even with the amendment, "the parties
would still be free at the sentencing hearing to comment on the presentence report, and in the
discretion of the court, to introduce evidence concerning their objections to the report." (Id.)
Thus, to rely on the federal cases to say there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel
disregards the practical reality that federal defendant's have a right, albeit by rule, to have their
counsel's advice and presence, during the information gathering process of the presentence
report. Additionally, the precedent relied on by the Stuart Court is unlikely to be overruled when
it no longer has any force given F.R.Cr.P. 32. The comments to the rules also implicitly
recognize the potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights in the form of Fifth
Amendment violations in that it allows objections to be made during the information gathering
process of the presentence report, supporting the assertion of the Fifth Amendment prior to
making the incriminating statements.
Additionally, the federal cases that don't find a Sixth Amendment right generally don't
have support in the Supreme Court cases upon which they rely.

ii.

The Federal Cases Rely On The Distinction Of The Probation
Officer's Role As An Extension Of The Court And Not An Agent
Of The Government Which Is Not Supported By The United States
Supreme Court Cases

Although the Ninth Circuit has held that, "it is now the law of this circuit that the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments apply to a presentence interview in preparation for a capital sentencing

the individual has an adversarial role, such as law enforcement, that weighs in favor of finding a
Sixth Amendment right in the presentence process.
However, this distinction is not the basis in any of the United States Supreme Court cases
defining critical stages for purposes of a Sixth Amendment analysis. Instead, the Court focuses
on the need to protect the rights of the defendant against unfairness and prejudice. As noted
above, in Wade, supra, the Court explained:
It is central to [the Sixth Amendment] principle that in addition to counsel's
presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that the need not stand alone against
the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where
counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial.
Wade, 388 U.S. at 226-227; See also, Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964),
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932), Gertstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1975) and
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981 ). Additionally, State courts have begun to recognize Sixth
Amendment rights during the information gathering process of the PSI.
iii.

Recently, State Courts Have Recognized And Provided Sixth
Amendment Protections During The Information Gathering
Process Of The PSI

The Idaho Supreme Court found a Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
applied to psychosexual evaluations prepared as part of a PSI because of the nature of the indepth and personal information gathered. Estrada, supra. The Supreme Court additionally
found a Sixth Amendment right to counsel as part of that evaluation, holding that, "It makes no
sense that a defendant would be entitled to counsel up through conviction or entry of a guilty
plea, and would also be entitled to representation at sentencing, yet would not be entitled to the
advice of counsel in the interim period regarding a psychosexual evaluation." Estrada, 143
Idaho 562, 149 P.3d at 837. It also makes no sense that one has a Sixth Amendment right during

revocation as well as all post-indictment out-of-court critical stages where, without the assistance
of counsel, the legal interests of the defendant might be prejudiced." Id. at 906.
Thus, the court found pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, the client was entitled to the
assistance of counsel when the district court seeks information from the defendant, whether that
request is made in court by the judge or out of court by an agent of the court. Id. at 318 64 7 P .2d
at 907.

The Oregon court noted that the reason the defendant was entitled to the Sixth

Amendment protection was because of the implication of the Fifth Amendment: "The decisive
factor in any presentence setting is not the official capacity or profession of the presentence
investigator or the setting in which the inquiry is made, but rather the willingness of the
defendant to provide information." Id. at 907. The court then ultimately held, "With the
assistance of counsel, a defendant can decide advisedly and voluntarily whether it is in his best
interest to submit to interviews and examinations and, if so, whether with or without his attorney
in attendance." Id.
Other courts have subsequently held similarly. See State v. Cox, 519 A.2d 1144 (Vt.
1987) (where the defendant had requested additional legal advice prior to participating in the PSI
and the probation officer said that if he waited for counsel he would forfeit his ability to have the
PSI, the Court held that was coercive, rendering his statements involuntary in violation of the
Fifth Amendment); but see State v. Cyr, 726 A.2d 488 (Vt. 1999), (the record was insufficient to
decide whether client was entitled to the assistance of counsel pursuant to the Sixth Amendment
or whether he was entitled to Miranda warnings prior to participating in the PSI and that
regardless, there was no coercion nor an assertion of his Fifth Amendment right during the
presentence investigation).

indigent and inept at great disadvantage." Id. at 296. The court further found that, "The
presentence interview plays a crucial role in determining the probation officer's recommended
sentence ... ," and that "[a]t a presentence interview, a defendant is likely to address matters that
were not raised at trial and that will likely have a significant impact on sentence. Moreover, a
defendant's statements during a presentence interview can even have an impact on later
prosecutions - of both the defendant and others." Id. at 296.

In recognizing that the majority of the federal cases hold there is no Sixth Amendment
right to counsel at the presentence interview, the Vermont Court held that those cases were either
unpersuasive or inapplicable because many of the federal cases relied on the nature of the
probation officer "as an extension of the court and not an agent of the govermnent" to find the
presentence process was not a critical stage - a distinction that was not present in the United
States Supreme Court cases addressing the issue.

Id. at 299. Instead, the Court said, the

Supreme Court cases that determined whether a Sixth Amendment right to counsel existed
"depend[ ] primarily on the possibility of prejudice and unfairness in the proceedings and the
ability of the presence of counsel to protect against such prejudice and unfairness." Id. at 300.
After reviewing several United States Supreme Court cases, the Vermont court, citing United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), clearly articulated the standard that did not rely on the
nature of the person doing the evaluation, but rather, "a criminal defendant is entitled to counsel
'at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence
might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial. Carter, 848 A.2d at 300.
The Court further echoed the findings of the Oregon court in Jones, supra, noting that
simply because the PSI was done for the judge's convenience in an out-of-court forum, it was
essentially a function of the court, and thus, the client was entitled to counsel. 176 Vt. at 348,

convicted of the first degree murder charge and a second degree murder while armed with a
deadly weapon charge. Id. The PSI investigator tried to get the client to talk about the offense
but ultimately, after making some incriminating statements, the client said he wouldn't discuss it
any more. Id. at 706. The Investigator did not attempt to detain the client or continue with the
interview. Id. Mr. Everybodytalksabout was sentenced to the maximum term of 328 months
with community placement for two years. Id. at 694. The case was appealed, reversed on a jury
instruction issue and remanded to the district court. Id At the third trial, the PSI investigator
testified regarding the statements the client made at the interview. Id. The client moved to
suppress the testimony of the PSI investigator on the grounds of a Sixth Amendment violation.

Id. The court denied the motion on the grounds that the PSI investigator had no reason to believe
the client would make any incriminating statements, nor did she take any action that was
deliberately designed to elicit an incriminating statement. Id.
On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals held that Mr. Everybodytalksabout's Sixth
Amendment rights were not violated because although the PSI constituted a critical stage of the
proceeding, because his appeal was pending, the PSI investigator did not "deliberately elicit" the
statements. Id at 694-695.
On review, the Washington Supreme Court articulated the issue as whether, the PSI
constitutes a critical stage, and if so, if a government agent elicits information, were the
statements deliberately elicited. State v. Everybodytalksabout, 166 P.3d 693 (2007). The Court
found the presentence interview was a critical stage because not only did the state concede the
presentence interview was critical stage, but also because "the presentence interview here was
ultimately adversarial because although Everybodytalksabout's statements aided the court in

questions were more than just an effort to stimulate conversation, and they were
clearly about the crime charged. She explicitly asked Everybodytalksabout to
discuss the very crime for which he was charged and convicted, and the State
subsequently used Everybodytalksabout's own words to retry him for the same
crime.

Id.
As a result, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' Opinion and remanded the case for a
retrial without the statements on the grounds that the State violated the client's Sixth Amendment
right to assistance of counsel because the presentence interview constituted a critical stage of the
proceedings and the investigator deliberately elicited Everybodytalksabout's statements. Id. at
698.
While there are a few recent State court cases that hold there is no Fifth or Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, those cases are unavailing as the reasoning employed is faulty or
incomplete. For example, in State v. Kauk, 691 N.W.2d 606 (S.D. 2005), the Court engaged in
no analysis of the issue of whether there is a Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the
presentence interview. Instead, after string citing most of the relevant federal cases, the Court
stated, "Based upon the majority rule followed by the foregoing authorities, we hold that there
was no denial ofKauk's right to counsel during his presentence interview." Id. at 610. The flaw
in this case is that it does not recognize the F.R.Cr.P. 32 as superceding these federal cases, nor
does it recognize the trend in recent caselaw on the issue.
In State v. Sexton, 727 N. W.2d 560 (Wis. 2007), the client claimed that the court had
violated his Fifth Amendment rights by failing to advise him of his Miranda warnings prior to
participating in what the client called an "accusatorial" presentence interview. Id. at 564. The
client also claimed that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because he was
unable to consult with his attorney regarding the use of a prior PSI during the presentence
interview in the new case. Id. at 565.

rights. It also fails to recognize that one of the purposes of the Sixth Amendment right is to
protect against Fifth Amendment violations. The right to refuse to engage in any self-disclosure
or other incriminating statements prior to making the statements is the whole point of the Fifth
Amendment protection and that right can be protected by consulting with counsel before making
the statements.
In State v. Johnson, 836 N.E.2d 1243 (Ohio 2005), while undergoing a drug and alcohol
evaluation to be used by the court during sentencing in a homicide case, the juvenile confessed to
an unrelated murder. Id. at 1246-1247. The social worker performing the drug and alcohol
evaluator relayed that information to the client's probation officer. Id. at 1247. The probation
officer then interviewed the client for his presentence interview and clarified with the client that
all information would be relayed to the judge. Id. She then asked a standard question of whether
he had ever fired a weapon, and after he responded affirmatively, she then asked, "What
happened?" Id. The juvenile filed a motion to suppress his statements to the social worker doing
the drug and alcohol evaluation because he was not provided Miranda warnings and also because
of a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 1250. He also moved to suppress the
statements to the probation officer under the Fifth Amendment. Id.
Citing the federal cases that held that "the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation is
not present in a prearranged, routine probation interview" (internal citations omitted), the Court
held that the client was in custody during the interview, and although the PSI was prearranged,
the interview was not "routine." Id. at 1257 (emphasis in original). This PSI was not routine
because of the information provided to the PSI investigator prior to the interview by the social
worker - that the client had confessed to an unrelated murder. Id at 1250. The Court further
held that because the probation officer deliberately elicited the information by asking, "What

iv.

There Is A Significant Distinction Between Federal Presentence
Investigators And Idaho Presentence Investigators

Even if there is no Sixth Amendment right in the federal presentence process, there is a
Sixth Amendment right in Idaho State courts. Unlike federal presentence investigators, Idaho
presentence investigators are members of the executive branch, not the judicial branch, and are
not an "extension of the court," but are rather "an agent of the government." Thus, as noted in
Leonti, supra:

While the process is not strictly adversarial in nature, the government is not
transformed into a neutral and impartial "arm of the court" simply because it is
seeking information from the defendant. While seeking [the defendant's]
assistance [by providing information], the government continues to
simultaneously seek the imposition of a sentence for his crime, . . . In this way, a
defendant's presentence cooperation is somewhat similar to police interrogation.
Any speculative benefits he may receive from providing information do not
change the essentially adversarial nature of the encounter.
Leonti, 326 F.3d at 1119 -1120 (9 th Cir. 2003). While the issue in Leonti was whether failing to

effectively assist a defendant awaiting sentencing in his willing efforts to provide cooperation to
an interested government can constitute a Sixth Amendment violation, the reasoning defining the
adversarial nature of the relationship between the federal agents and the defendant during a
cooperation agreement also applies and defines the relationship between defendants and
presentence investigators in the State of Idaho. In Idaho, the presentence investigator is an
employee of the Department of Corrections, who will ultimately recommend to the court whether
the

individual

should

be

incarcerated

or

placed

on

probation.

(I.C.R.

32;

http://corrections.state.id.us/about us/overview.html). The Presentence Investigator is seeking
the imposition of specific, recommended sentence, and, in fact, recommends whether the
defendant should be incarcerated, given a period of retained jurisdiction, or placed on probation.
In this setting, certainly any benefits the defendant may obtain by providing non-public
infnrmMion does not "change the essentially adversarial nature of the encounter" and thus,

Additionally, in Stuart, the PSI was not part of the record on appeal and thus, as noted in
the Concurrence, mandated a finding that the missing PSI must be presumed to support the
action of the trial court." Id. (citations omitted). Here, the inclusion of the PSI provides the
additional information that was not present in Stuart for a finding that Stuart is inapposite to the
case at bar.

C.

The District Court Erred In Finding That Mr. Hughes Waived His Fifth Amendment
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The district court erred in finding that Mr. Hughes waived his Fifth Amendment privilege

against self-incrimination by only determining that Mr. Hughes, "has not shown that he protested
to participating in the PSI. He only claims that [trial counsel] did not tell him of his right against
self-incrimination.

Without a showing that he protested to participating in the PSI, Hughes

waived his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination." (R., p.144.) As argued in
Section II, above, and incorporated herein by reference, Mr. Hughes fell within one of the
recognized exceptions to invoking the Fifth Amendment right to still obtain its protections.
Because the district court failed to determine whether Mr. Hughes fell within one of these
exceptions, it erred in finding that Mr. Hughes waived any Fifth Amendment protections.

D.

Mr. Hughes Established Prejudice As A Result Of Participating In The PSI
The prejudice prong is set forth in Section I above, and need not be repeated but is

incorporated herein by reference.

Additionally, because the psychosexual evaluation was

incorporated into the PSI, it tainted the PSI.

For example, the presentence investigator

specifically referenced and attached the evaluation. (PSI, p.13.) Another problematic area was
the Defendant's Version of the PSI. It provided far greater detail for the offense than did the
charging document to which Mr. Hughes pied. (compare, PSI, pp.3-4 to Tr., 30834, 11/21/2003,

The District Court Erroneously Analyzed Mr. Hughes' Claim That His Attorney Rendered
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For Failing To Obtain An Independent, Confidential
Evaluation Such That The Evaluation Could Be Reviewed By Mr. Hughes And His Counsel
Prior To The Release Of That Information To The District Court And The State

A.

Introduction
Mr. Hughes asserts that the district court incorrectly analyzed his claim that his attorney

performed below a reasonable standard when he failed to get an independent, confidential
evaluation so that he could review that document with counsel prior to that information being
released to the district court and the State. Because of the concomitant deficient performance,
Mr. Hughes suffered prejudice, thus establishing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

B.

The District Court Erroneously Analyzed Mr. Hughes' Claim That His Attorney
Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For Failing To Obtain An Independent,
Confidential Evaluation Such That The Evaluation Could Be Reviewed By Mr. Hughes
And His Counsel Prior To The Release Of That Information To The District Court And
The State
Mr. Hughes asserted in his petition that his attorney,
did not insure that defendant had an independent psychiatrist as part of the
psychosexual evaluation, when the defendant had a right to the assistance of an
independent psychiatrist and thus, did not determine, prior to sentencing, what
"claims should be presented to the fact-finder or in interpreting the reports [sic]
findings or rebutting the states [sic] evidence."

(R., pp.8, 21.) The concerns with the psychosexual evaluation were articulated by trial counsel

at sentencing, who requested a different or additional evaluation. (Tr. 30823, 3/26/2004, p.4,
L.16-p.5, L.15.) The reason for the request was that the petitioner, through counsel, felt that,
there were some issues of communication and trust between my client and the
evaluator. There were two occasions when the evaluation was required, or the
evaluator was required to contact my client. I think areas which the evaluator
stated my client was deceptive he was in fact not deceptive, but the evaluator
chose not to believe him.

appointed by the court for purposes of a presentence investigation, counsel for Wood would have
had the opportunity to advise his client of the possible uses of the information and of the
privilege against self-incrimination." Id. at 100, 967 P.2d at 714.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the United States Supreme Court
noted that, "strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than
complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional
judgments support the limitations on investigation,"

Id at 690-691, thus establishing an

attorney's obligation to engage in an investigation into relevant caselaw. The Strickland Court
also noted the attorney's obligation to advocate for his client. Id. at 688. Idaho State Bar Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.1 requires an attorney to provide competent representation, including
"the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter. .. the analysis of precedent ... [and]
detennining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve .... " (Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.1(1) and (2)).

Moreover, in Nelson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d 903 (5 th Cir., 1981),

although holding that that the attorney is not expected to foresee future new developments, that
court noted that, "The decisions in [previous casesJ make it clear that a failure of counsel to be
aware of prior controlling precedents in even a single prejudicial instance might render counsel's
assistance ineffective under the Sixth Amendment." Id at 908.
In the case at bar, the district court made it clear that he would "very heavily" rely on the
information in the PSI and told Mr. Hughes "It is important that you answer those questions fully
and candidly." (Tr. 30823, l l/21/2003, p.31, Ls.6-10.) Therefore, Mr. Hughes asserts that his
attorney should have known the importance of his answers to the PSI questions and should have
protected his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination before it was violated. Here, that

C.

Conclusion
Mr. Hughes asserts that the district court erred in incorrectly analyzing this claim and

therefore, this claim should be remanded to the district court for the requisite factual and legal
findings.

V.
District Court Erroneously Analyzed Whether Mr. Hughes' Trial Counsel Rendered
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For Failing To File A Motion To Suppress The Polygraph

A.

Introduction
Mr. Hughes asserts that the district court erred when it granted the State's Motion to
Dismiss on this ground, where the State incorrectly analyzed the issue of whether
Mr. Hughes' attorney was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the polygraph.

B.

The District Court Erroneously Analyzed Whether Mr. Hughes Trial Counsel Rendered
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For Failing To File A Motion To Suppress The
Polygraph
In his affidavit in support of his Petition, Mr. Hughes clarified the claim he was raising in

his Petition, stating:
The State accused the petitioner of deviant behavior thirty-five years ago, and told
the petitioner they wanted to give him a polygraph test. The petitioner initially
refused, but, he was told if he didn't the judge would "throw the book at him."
The petitioner did not have an attorney present during the polygraph test, his
Miranda rights were not read prior to the polygraph which was used at sentencing
to assist the states case. His attorney never objected at sentencing. The polygraph
should have been suppressed in court.

(R., p.15.) Later, in his Affidavit of Derrick L. Hughes, Mr. Hughes wrote:
When I was asked to take a polygraph, I told the police officer I did not want to
take it, at least not without a lawyer present. The officers continued to badger me
until I succumbed and took the test without an attorney present. Questioning in
the polygraph concerned incidents which had occurred thirty years ago rather than

1.

Trial Counsel Was Deficient In Failing To Object Or Move To Suppress The
Results Of The Polygraph Examination

In order to show his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file
a motion to suppress, the appellate courts examine "the probability of success of such a motion."
Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 976 P.2d 927 (1999). It is apparent that while Mr. Hughes trial

counsel requested that his sentencing hearing be continued so that Mr. Hughes could obtain an
independent evaluation, his trial counsel never object to, or moved to suppress the results of the
polygraph test, which was given despite Mr. Hughes' requests to speak with his attorney.
(Tr. 30823, pp.3 - 48), and despite the fact that counsel had notice of that error through, at a
minimum, the comment in the psychosexual evaluation. (PSI, p.31.) Because Mr. Hughes was
questioned, despite his request to speak with his attorney and that his attorney be present during
the polygraph, his trial counsel was deficient for failing to object or move to suppress the results
of the polygraph examination. (See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 677 (1988) citing
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 (1981) (holding that "a suspect who has 'expressed

his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by
the authorities unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges or
conversations with the police."'))
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that a defendant
has a constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. U.S. CONST amend. V. "The Fifth
Amendment privilege is 'as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard,' and the
privilege is fulfilled only when a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right 'to remain silent
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty ...
for such silence."' Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 467-467 (1981) (internal citations omitted). A

United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462 (1994) (suspect's statement that "maybe I should talk to a
lawyer" was not an assertion of the right to counsel); State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 853, 26 P.3d
31, 36 (2001).

As discussed in Sections II and III, and incorporated herein by reference,

Mr. Hughes has established a Fifth Amendment right in the psychosexual evaluation, including
the polygraph. See Estrada, 143 Idaho 558 at 563, 149 P.3d 833 at 838.
Mr. Hughes alleged that he did request counsel prior to participating in the polygraph.
(R., pp.8-9, 15.) The State asserted that Mr. Hughes did not "indicate in his allegation that he
asked for counsel, or was refused the right to counsel, or even chose to not have counsel during
the polygraph. (R., pp.63.) Mr. Hughes thereafter filed an Affidavit claiming, "When I was
asked to take a polygraph, I told the police officers I did not want to take [the polygraph], at least
not without a lawyer present." (R., pp.116-117.) This is supported by the PSI, of which the
court took judicial notice wherein the polygraph examiner wrote, '(Note - Prior to participating
in his polygraph on 2/11/04, Derrick stated he did not want to take the scheduled polygraph
because 1. He hadn't talked with his attorney .... " (PSI, p.31.) Following the filing of this
affidavit, the State filed another response, and, as to this particular claim, stated, "In his
Affidavit, the petitioner reiterates his objections to taking a polygraph without a lawyer present,
and to the subject matter of the polygraph. The State analyzed these issues in our Brief at pages
9 and 11 and on other pages in the Brief." (R., p.124.) While the State moved for summary
dismissal,
Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised
no genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would
entitle the applicant to the relief requested. A material fact has "some logical
connection with the consequential facts [,]" Black's Law Dictionary, 991 (7th
Ed.1999), and therefore is determined by its relationship to the legal theories
presented by the parties. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary
hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159,
1163 (Ct.App.1991). However, summary dismissal may be appropriate even

VI.

The District Court, Despite Finding That Mr. Hughes' Attorney Provided Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel For Failing To Advise His Client Regarding Participation In The
Psychosexual Evaluation, Incorrectly Analyzed The Prejudice Prong Of The Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel Claim, And Thus, Erroneously Dismissed That Claim

A.

Introduction
The district court correctly concluded that Mr. Hughes' trial counsel was deficient in

failing to warn Mr. Hughes of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination prior to
the psychosexual evaluation, but erred in concluding that Mr. Hughes did not suffer prejudice as
a result of his counsel's deficient conduct.

B.

The District Court, Despite Finding That Mr. Hughes' Attorney Provided Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel For Failing To Advise His Client Regarding Participation In The
Psychosexual Evaluation, Incorrectly Analyzed The Prejudice Prong Of The Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel Claim, And Thus, Erroneously Dismissed That Claim
A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under

both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 13
of the Idaho Constitution.

A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of

counsel extends to all critical stages of the prosecution where his substantial rights may be
affected, and sentencing is one such stage. Retamoza v. State, 125 Idaho 792, 874 P.2d 503
(Ct. App. 1994) (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134, (1967)).

Recently, the Idaho

Supreme Court determined that a court-ordered psychological evaluation is a critical stage in
which a criminal defendant "does have a right to at least the advice of counsel regarding his
participation in the psychosexual evaluation." Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 562-563, 149
P.3d 833, 837-838 (2007).

2.

The District Court Erred In Concluding That Mr. Hughes Was Not Prejudiced By
His Counsel's Deficient Performance

The prejudice analysis is set forth in Section I, above, and incorporated herein by
reference.

C.

Conclusion
For the reasons listed above, Mr. Hughes requests that this Court find the post conviction

court incorrectly analyzed the prejudice prong, articulate the correct standard for determining
prejudice where the Sixth and Fifth Amendment protections have been violated and thereafter,
remand this case to the district court for the appropriate factual and legal findings.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hughes respectfully requests that this Court find that the district court erroneously
dismissed Mr. Hughes' claim that his attorney was ineffective for failing to be present during a
psychosexual evaluation pursuant to both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, because although
correctly finding that counsel was not present, it did not determine why counsel was not present,
and thus remand this case on those issue for factual findings, if necessary, in light of the
appropriate legal standards. Mr. Hughes would also like this Court to find his attorney rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to file a motion to suppress and the information
contained in the unconstitutionally-obtained polygraph and when he failed to obtain a
confidential, independent evaluation and review such evaluation with Mr. Hughes prior to the
release of that information to the State and the court. Finally, M. Hughes requests that this Court
articulate the correct test to determine the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis when the
district court relied on a PSI and psyschosexual evaluation obtained in violation of Mr. Hughes'
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